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Abstract: The homo oeconomicus model is an essential concept of the neoclassical analysis. It defines 
the agent capable of rational choices in pursuing the maximization of his own utility functions. Over time, the 
notion remained at the basis of many debates, related mainly to its relevance. However, the concept remained, 
until now, a fundamental component of mainstream analysis. This article aims to present a brief overview of 
the arguments that support the use of this model, but also its limitations and inconsistencies. Our main goal is 
to analyze if homo oeconomicus can be or not considered an ideal representation of the economic agent. 
Further, the analysis emphasize on the attribute of rationality, which is one of the most disputed feature in the 
literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The neoclassical homo oeconomicus is assumed to have both descriptive and predictive power. 
Its  construction required the selection  and simplification of the human characteristics and their 
embedding in concrete and consistent assumptions. This allowed the mathematical operationalization 
of the economic behaviour on the basis of the laws of logic. In this article we want to understand the 
model in terms of the benefits it offers as well as the criticisms against it. In addition, we intend to 
analyze  the  notion  of  rationality,  which  together  with  self  interest,  are  the  two  basic  human 
characteristics considered in the neoclassical economic vision. 
Although accepted as the main tool of mainstream analysis, homo oeconomicus raises a main 
question about its representativeness. This article aims to briefly examine the extent in which its use 
is appropriate. The goal of any science is to know the reality exactly as it is. Imaginary and fantastic 
creations are welcomed in art, but they have no place in the economic science. Researchers need to 
move away from fictional models or utopian constructs that could never be found in practice. In this 
regard,  von  Hayek’s  ([1988]1998,  p.  76)  remark  is  more  than  eloquent:  “The  curious  task  of 
economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can 
design”. 
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IS HOMO OECONOMICUS AN IDEAL MODEL? 
 
According to some opinions, homo oeconomicus is an ideal model. In this respect, Milton 
Friedman ([1958]2008, p. 153-158) considered that in most situations both companies and individuals 
rationally seek to maximize their profits or utility acting as if they had all the necessary information 
to achieve this aim. Thus, they act as if, on the basis of the available knowledge, they calculate the 
costs and the benefits for all the alternative courses of action and, finally, choose the one that offers 
the greatest profit or utility. The author argues that this is a natural tendency, although in general it is 
not acknowledged by the agents, that don’t effectively solve complex systems of equations as some 
economists do. Regarding the relevance of the neoclassical homo oeconomicus model, Friedman 
argues that the success of a theory is given by its predictive power. This is the element which must 
reflect the reality, and not the assumptions. Moreover, the predictive power of a theory is contrasting 
to the realism of its assumption. An assumption (and a theory) is truly important and meaningful to 
the extent that it can explain as much as possible through fewer elements. This process requires 
descriptive abstract representations. Thus, the more accurate is a theory, the more unrealistic are the 
hypothesis on which it is build. However, the neoclassical economists postulated that the economic 
agents  are  perfectly  rational  and  narrowly  self-interested  in  any  market  circumstances.  This 
characterization has led many scholars to claim that the neoclassical model represents the ideal man 
– an economic agent that acts almost mechanically in pursuit of maximizing its own utility and has 
the cognitive abilities to succeed in this attempt. Homo oeconomicus is an abstract model which 
respects the hypothesis’s construction postulated by Friedman. The challenge is if this representation 
of the economic agent has the power to make accurate predictions. The answer to this question is 
perhaps best exemplified by the recent developments of the global economy, when the economic 
crisis in 2007 took by surprise both scholars business man. 
However, von Mises ([1949]1998, pp. 60-63, 646-647) argued that homo oeconomicus is not 
even an ideal pattern of the economic man. Outlining the picture of the perfect economic man would 
require the consideration of several aspects of the various human goals and desires and not only some 
of  them.  Such  a  representation  should  incorporate  complex  human  features.  The  ideal,  which 
represents perfection itself, means, in ultimate instance, the power to be complete. Therefore, an ideal 
model would require to considerate all the relevant elements, not to reduce them to a few hypothetical 
variables. It would demand a perfect understanding of all human characteristics and of all reasons 
and goals underlying an action. How far we are from this complete understanding, when the human 
brain is still surrounded by many mysteries and some notions that at a first look seem so simple (such Paula-Elena DIACON 
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as the concept of consciousness and rationality*) cannot be yet completely explained! At least until 
today, no philosophy and no theory could be valid at an absolute level.  Von Mises argued that the 
economic theory should have as a major objective the analysis of how market prices are formed in 
real transitions and not how they would take place if people would be different from what they really 
are. Economic analysis should not remain in the shadow of the “phantom” of homo oeconomicus. 
From this point of view, many economists criticize the model, describing it as illusory, because such 
a person is not found in everyday life. This representation omitted some important human features 
(such as emotions, attitudes and values) that represent strong motivations for actions. No individual 
is animated on the market only by purely economic motives – by the desire to get in any circumstances 
and at any cost the highest monetary gain possible. Since it analyzes a fictitious being, this model is 
often considered unrealistic. Economics studies (or should study) the actions of real people which 
actually occur on the market, with all their imperfect characteristics and attributes.  
 
RATIONALITY AS A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF HOMO OECONOMICUS 
 
The homo oeconomicus’ main and most disputed feature is its perfect rationality. The individual 
is endowed by nature with reason. Here, is necessary to make a clarification between reason and 
rationality. The reason is an internal feature specific to the human being. The complex structure, the 
invisible force and the fact that it is particular to each individual are just some of its characteristic 
elements that caused many and varied interpretations since ancient times. Aristotle said, for example, 
that “the characteristic activity of a human being is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason 
or at least not entirely lacking it” (Aristotel, 2004, p. 12). In general, reason is associated with (logical 
and  formal)  thinking  and  cognition.  It  is  seen  as  the  psychological  instance  that  precedes  and 
determines the action. All human experiences, sensations and perceptions are always passed through 
the mind filter and transformed in coherent and understandable elements. Reason is brought in 
economics through its function of rationality, respectively the individuals’ trait of being rational. The 
neoclassic economists claim that the economic action is not only rational (in terms of logically 
thought), but perfectly rational (in the sense of utility maximizing). 
                                                 
* Rationality is a highly debated concept in all the social sciences because it underlies human knowledge. It has no 
universally  accepted  definition  or  interpretation.  The  issue  is  a  basic  scientific  interrogation,  many  philosophers, 
economists, psychologists, anthropologists, etc. trying to clarify its sense. The theme is complex and involves many 
adjacent elements, such as the distinctions between rational – irrational, reason – feelings and passions, reason – will, 
reason – intellect, etc. THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF HOMO OECONOMICUS AND ITS RATIONALITY 
      32 
Human thinking, however, is neither omniscient nor perfect. In the human psyche, reason 
does not “work” alone, but the thinking is aided by emotions. Furthermore, many cognitive elements 
(such as memory and attention) have certain limitations. One of the main concerns in cognitive 
psychology, for example, is the study of the manner in which the individual attempts and success to 
solve problems. Studies in this direction have shown that, if this process is complex, individuals will 
often resort to certain cognitive shortcuts, known as heuristics. Heuristics are quick and simple 
mental commands (or rules of thumb) that individuals often use in order to form judgments, before 
acting. They increase the possibility that a task will be successfully accomplished, especially because 
it shortens the time required for deliberation. However, the task fulfilment does not imply that the 
solution will be accurate. On the contrary, experts consider that the use of heuristics leads in the most 
cases to incorrect solutions. In complex situations which require a short time allotted for the decision, 
the person usually tends to consider only certain elements of the problems (those known from 
previous experience, for example) and ignoring others (the new ones that are more difficult to 
manage). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have shown that the best known heuristics that usually lead 
to erroneous solutions are: representativeness (the tendency to judge a problem based on the situation 
to which it most resembles), availability (the tendency to assess a situation based on how easily the 
information comes to mind), and anchoring and adjustment (the tendency to estimate starting from a 
benchmark value around which people adjust their answers). 
Some  specialists,  such  as  Zafirovski  (2008),  argue  that  in  time  the  concept  of  economic 
rationality migrated from the complex vision of socio-economic pluralism to a reductionist one. From 
this perspective, the traditional conceptualization lost ground in behalf of the utilitarian definition. 
Rationality became a more limited and well-defined concept associated to utility maximization. In 
this sense, Amartya Sen (2004, pp. 4-19; 206-207) argues that in the mainstream economic theory 
the notion of rationality is not used with a unique sense, but it has three different meanings, 
respectively:  internal  consistency  of  action,  self-interest  maximization  and  expected  utility 
maximization in general. The author claimed that the rational choice theory is not sufficient, both 
when uncertainty is present or not. Although the restricted vision promoted by the neoclassical 
economists was designed to simplify the modelling of the economic behaviour, it had a radical effect 
dissociating the individual from the moral side of its life, from ethics and from values. The demand 
of abstraction can be simply defined, in the Friedman’s tradition, as to say “much with little”. It 
involves the consideration of two requirements that are often antithetical and raise a problem of 
opposition between simplicity and relevance: the need for tractability (the demand to capture the 
behaviour in a canonical form that is enough accessible to enable relevant analyzes) and the need for Paula-Elena DIACON 
33 
veracity (the necessity that the model is not in contradiction with the true elements it represents). In 
other words, the construction of a theory raises an inherent conflict between a need for formalism and 
a need for realism. This is best captured in the model of homo oeconomicus and its assumed perfect 
rationality. However, Sen proposed a different interpretation of rationality, a more general one, in 
which it represents the ability to analyze under a justified examination, under the “reasoned scrutiny”, 
the choices of an individual in terms of its actions, goals, values and priorities.  
In economics, von Mises ([1949]1998, pp. 18-19) claimed that the term “rational action” is a 
pleonastic construct. By reporting to ends, human action is necessarily and always a result of 
judgment. Economics studies only conscious actions intentionally directed toward a specific goal. 
From this perspective, related to the purpose of an action, the individual will always act rationally 
in order to replace a situation which he finds unsatisfactory to a more satisfactory one. Man thinks 
this action: he always forms a mental image of the desired goals and the ways to reach them. Human 
life itself is always under the auspices of rationality. The individual always choose consciously and 
with his cognitive faculties the actions that he wants to accomplish and the resources he needs to do 
this. Human judgment, however, admits mistake. Man does not have the ability to forecast the future. 
Moreover,  his  present  knowledge  is  limited,  not  absolute.  Rationality,  in  general  sense,  is  not 
synonymous with maximization or optimization. It does not count the efficiency to achieve a certain 
purpose or the resources’ adequacy to it. Rationality offers instead justification to the decision maker. 
Considering the environmental limitations and making use of their mental facilities,  individuals 
expect their actions to have the desired results. However, the fact that his actions will not have the 
expected outcome does not make the approach less rational. 
People have different aspirations. Each individual has a unique set of values, which is the result 
of a complex matrix of economic, psychological, cultural and social factors. The preferences of an 
individual for the material aspects of life, determines actions as rational as the ideal goals of moral, 
religious or philosophical convictions. Although the physiological needs are basic motivators of 
human action, as their fulfilment represent a prerequisite for the preservation of life, the fact that an 
individual can give up its complete satisfaction to meet other ideals, does not make the action less 
rational. Thus, related to the motivations of an action, we can say that, in general, the arguments 
which lie behind it cannot limit its rational attribute. No person can contest what would make another 
one more content. Economics, therefore, only studies the rational actions. Moreover, the way in which 
this concern is achieved lies under the auspices of cognitive knowledge. Any scientific manifestation 
is a rational one. Human action cannot take place outside the reason. The cognitive faculties of the 
mind are the structures that allow the human being to understand the world and his own nature.  THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF HOMO OECONOMICUS AND ITS RATIONALITY 
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What neoclassical economists understand through rational action departs from the strict sense 
of the concept. In this view, the agent will always follow to maximize its own utility, knowing as 
many (if not all) relevant information as possible. Regarding this, Stiglitz argued, for example, that 
through rationality neoclassic economists refer rather than otherwise to the consistency of individual 
preferences over time. The author claimed that “rationality to an economist does not mean that 
individuals necessarily act in ways that are more broadly consistent with what makes them happy” 
(Stiglitz, 2010, p. 109). Utility maximization is, in last instance, synonymous with the maximization 
of pleasure or happiness. Emotions, are, however, neglected (or considered an exogenous variable) 
by the mainstream analysis. Rational behaviour is considered to be the one that determines the use of 
intelligence (which is not unbounded) to find, in the specific circumstances (including the limited 
resources), the best alternative solution of a problem. In this vision, the neoclassic economic man 
seems an ideal genius, endowed with unbounded cognitive powers, which can collect and process 
(thought complex mathematical calculations) a large amount of data in a short time. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In  the  neoclassical  view,  the  premises,  on  which  homo  oeconomicus  is  built,  outline  the 
attributes of the perfect economic agent. However, some critics claim that this image of the economic 
agent is not an ideal one, since its perfection would need to take into consideration all the real and 
significant human characteristics, and not only some hypothetical attributes. No research and no 
theoretical model have provided, until now, a perfect and complete explanation of reality. However, 
in the neoclassical view, the problems arise when the analyses, which are targeting the market and 
the real behaviour of the individual, disregard the errors. The errors occur in overlapping the abstract 
model to reality, on the one hand, and between forecasting the future and its true course, on the other 
hand. 
The individual does not have the capabilities of an absolute and omniscient mind. His mind 
cannot grasp the full and perfect meaning of the exterior events and phenomena, and not even of his 
own actions and physical activity. To what extent, in these circumstances, can homo oeconomicus 
offer a reliable source of knowledge of the acting individual? He represents the normative and 
prescriptive image of how a so called ideational human being would behave on the market. But it is 
a utopia and it does not capture the real individual.  
The model  can help  economics  as  far  as  it wants  to  know the parameters  of  an optimal 
behaviour. The economic analysis that relates only to this representation is not, however, real and it Paula-Elena DIACON 
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only provides a partial picture of it. Evolution and progress are characteristics of human nature, in 
general, and of academic endeavour, in particular. 
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